Fiabilismo Robusto de virtudes colectivas
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En la epistemología contemporánea, dos influyentes corrientes han evolucionado en paralelo: el fiabilismo de virtudes y la epistemología colectiva o de grupos. Pese a los intentos por integrar ambas (Carter, 2022; Đorđević y Berber, 2025; Greco, 2021; Harris, 2025; Jarczewski, 2024; Jarczewski y Riggs, 2025; Palermos, 2022; Palermos y Pritchard, 2016), la versión más robusta del fiabilismo de virtudes (Sosa, 1991, 2007, 2009, 2011, 2015, 2021), ofrece una doble resistencia a dicho proyecto. Por un lado, niega su compatibilidad con la epistemología colectiva (Sosa, 2007, pp. 94-95); por otro, reduce esta última a un caso marginal dentro del propio marco sosiano (Kallestrup, 2020). Este artículo analiza las condiciones que sustentan ambas estrategias—identificadas como Incompatibilidad y Excepcionalidad— para someterlas a revisión crítica desde una alternativa positiva, Compatibilidad, que busca mostrar cómo la noción de virtud epistémica puede extenderse de manera coherente a agentes irreductiblemente colectivos. El resultado es una propuesta de fiabilismo de virtudes colectivas robusto, capaz de reconciliar la normatividad individual y la grupal sin sacrificar el realismo epistémico propio del modelo de Sosa.
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