Is reliabilist virtue epistemology a meritocratic theory?
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We argue that the epistemology of reliable virtues, in its current state, assumes a meritocratic logic, in accordance with a social model that links justice to the recognition of the merits demonstrated by citizens. This model has been rightly criticized for masking deep structural inequalities, ignoring the conditions that allow individuals to develop and manifest the successes we attribute to them, and promoting an individualistic, competitive, and unsupportive model of society. But we also maintain that reliability can resist this tendency if it recognizes, first, the social nature of epistemic achievements; second, that the epistemic goal
to be assessed in terms of reliability is public and shared knowledge; and, third, that it is necessary to develop critical conceptions of epistemic luck and risk.
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