Sobre la defensa de las instituciones filosóficas
Barra lateral del artículo
Contenido principal del artículo
En la tradición filosófica, se acepta ampliamente que las intuiciones suelen servir como fuente principal de orientación en nuestro razonamiento, especialmente en el contexto de problemas complejos y abstractos. En consecuencia, algunos filósofos sostienen que
las intuiciones poseen una función epistémica distintiva y son capaces de proporcionar una visión auténtica de los dilemas filosóficos. No obstante, este enfoque convencional ha sido objeto de un considerable debate, especialmente en lo que respecta a la fiabilidad de las intuiciones. De hecho, los recientes avances en el campo de la filosofía experimental han puesto en tela de juicio la universalidad de estos pensamientos intuitivos, demostrando su variabilidad entre diferentes culturas e individuos. Sin embargo, esta crítica, aunque significativa, pasa por alto un elemento fundamental: las intuiciones no son fenómenos estáticos, sino que se modifican, refinan y evalúan en el contexto de la praxis filosófica. En este sentido, la propuesta de Ernest Sosa puede arrojar luz sobre el papel de las intuiciones y cómo encajan en el trabajo filosófico competente.
Detalles del artículo
Cómo citar
Citas
BEALER, G. (1998). Intuition and the Autonomy of Philosophy. In M. DePaul and W. Ramsey (eds.), Rethinking Intuition: The Psychology and Its Role in Philosophical Inquiry. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield
BEALER, G. (2000). A Theory of the A Priori. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 81, pp. 1-30.
BENGSON, J. (2015). The intellectual given. Mind, 124(495), 707–760.
CAPPELEN, H. (2012). Philosophy Without Intuitions. Oxford University Press.
CHUDNOFF, E. (2013). Intuition. OUP Oxford.
CULLEN, S. (2010). Survey-driven romanticism. Review of philosophy and psychology, 1(2), 275-296. https://doi.org/10.1007/s13164-009-0016-1
DEVITT, M. (2006). Intuitions. In Ontology Studies Cuadernos de Ontología: Proceedings of VI International Ontology Congress, pp. 169–176.
DEVITT, M. (2010). What “intuitions” are linguistic evidence?. Erkenntnis, 73(2), 251-264.
DEVITT, M. (2015). Relying on Intuitions: Where Cappelen and Deutsch Go Wrong. Inquiry, 58, 669–699.
DOTSON, K. (2014). Conceptualizing epistemic oppression. Social Epistemology, 28(2), 115–138.
GARCÍA-ARNALDOS, M. D. (2018). ¿Intuición o confianza racional? Quaderns de filosofía, 5(2), 49-71.
GOLDMAN, A. (2007). Philosophical Intuitions: Their target, their source, and their epistemic status. Grazer Philosophische Studien, 74, 1–26.
HALES, S. (2006). Relativism and the Foundations of Philosophy. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
HANNON, M. (2018). Intuitions, reflective judgments, and experimental philosophy. Synthese, 195(9), 4147-4168.
HESNI, S. (2025). Philosophical intuitions about socially significant language. Hypatia, 40(1), 82–106.
HORVATH, J. (2010). How (not) to react to experimental philosophy. Philosophical Psychology 23: 447–480.
KAHNEMAN, D.; KLEIN, G. (2009). Conditions for intuitive expertise: A failure to disagree. American Psychologist, pp. 515–526.
KNOBE, J. M.; NICHOLS, S. (eds.) (2008). Experimental Philosophy. Oxford University Press.
KNOBE, J. (2006). Experimental philosophy. Philosophy Compass, 2(1), 81–92.
LEWIS, D. (1983). Philosophical papers (Vol. 1). Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/0195032047.001.0001
LUDWIG, K. (2007). The epistemology of thought experiments: First person versus third person approaches. Midwest Studies in Philosophy: Philosophy and the Empirical, 31, 128–159.
MACHERY, E. (2011). Thought experiments and philosophical knowledge. Metaphilosophy, 42(3), 191–214.
MACHERY, E. (2012). Expertise and Intuitions about Reference. THEORIA, 27(1), 37–54.
MACHERY, E. (2015). The illusion of expertise. In Experimental Philosophy, Rationalism, and Naturalism, pp. 188–203. Routledge.
MACHERY, E. (2017). Philosophy within its proper bounds. Oxford University Press.
MACHERY, E.; MALLON, R.; NICHOLS, S.; STICH, S. P. (2004). Semantics, cross-cultural style. Cognition, 92, (3):1–12.
MACHERY, E.; MALLON, R.; NICHOLS, S.; STICH, S. P. (2012). If folk intuitions vary, then what? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 3, 618–635.
NADO, J. (2012). Philosophical expertise. Philosophy Compass, 9(9), 631–641.
NADO, J. (2014). Why intuition? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 89(1), 15–41.
NADO, J. (2015a). Philosophical expertise and scientific expertise. Philosophical Psychology, 28(7), 1026–1044.
NADO, J. (2015b). Intuition, Philosophical Theorising, and the Threat of Scepticism. In Fischer, E.; Collins, J. (eds.), Experimental Philosophy, Rationalism, and Naturalism: Rethinking Philosophical Method. Routledge, pp. 204–221.
NADO, J. (2025). Intuition: A Brief Introduction. In Joachim Horvath, Steffen Koch & Michael
G. Titelbaum, Methods in Analytic Philosophy: A Primer and Guide. London, ON: PhilPapers Foundation. pp. 159-170.
NAGEL, J. (2013). Defending the evidential value of epistemic intuitions: A reply to Stich. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 87(1), 179–199.
PÉREZ OTERO, M. (2017). Teorías de la referencia, filosofía experimental y calibración de intuiciones. Theoria: an international journal for theory, history and foundations of science, 32(1), 41-62.
PUST J. (2000). Intuitions as Evidence. New York and London: Garland Publishing,
SOSA, E. (1991). Knowledge in Perspective. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
SOSA, E. (1997). Reflective knowledge in the best circles. The Journal of Philosophy, 94(8), 410–430. https://doi.org/10.2307/2564607
SOSA, E. (1998). Minimal intuition. In Depaul, M.; Ramsey, W. (eds.), Rethinking Intuition. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.
SOSA, E. (2001). Human knowledge, animal and reflective. Philosophical Studies, 106(3), 193–196. https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1013300923093
SOSA, E. (2006). Intuitions and Truth. In P. Greenough, & Lynch, M. P. (Eds.), Truth and realism. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 208-226.
SOSA, E. (2007a). A virtue epistemology: Apt belief and reflective knowledge (Vol. I). Oxford University Press.
SOSA, E. (2007b). Experimental philosophy and philosophical intuition. Philosophical studies, 132(1), 99-107.
SOSA, E. (2007c). Intuitions: Their nature and Epistemic Efficacy. In Beyer, C.; Burri, A. (eds.), Philosophical Knowledge: Its Possibility and Scope. Amsterdam: Rodopi.
SOSA, E. (2009). A defense of the use of intuitions in philosophy. In Murphy, D.; Bishop, M. (eds.), Stich and his Critics. John Wiley & Sons, pp. 101–112.
SOSA, E. (2010). La epistemología de las virtudes. KRK ediciones. Oviedo.
SOSA, E. (2013). Intuitions and Foundations. The Relevance of Moore and Wittgenstein. In Casullo, A.; Thurow, J. C. (eds.), The A Priori in Philosophy. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
SOSA, E. (2018a). Una epistemología de virtudes: Creencia apta y conocimiento reflexivo (vol. I). Zaragoza: Prensas de la Universidad de Zaragoza
SOSA, E. (2018b). Conocimiento reflexivo: Creencia apta y conocimiento reflexivo (vol. II). Zaragoza: Prensas de la Universidad de Zaragoza.
SOSA, E.; KIM, J.; FANTL, J.; MCGRATH, M. (eds.) (2008). Epistemology: An Anthology. 2nd ed. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing.
STICH, S. (1988). Reflective Equilibrium Analytic Epistemology and the Problem of Cognitive Diversity. Synthese, vol. 74, nº 3, p. 391–413.
WEINBERG, J.; NICHOLS, S.; STICH, S. (2008). Normativity and Epistemic Intuitions. In: Ernest Sosa, Jaegwon Kim, Jeremy Fantl, and Matthew McGrath. Epistemology: an anthology (2nd ed). Blackwell Publishing Ltd, pp. 625-646. (Originally published in Philosophical Topics 29, 1 and 2 (2001), pp. 429-60).
WEINBERG, J. M., GONNERMAN, C., BUCKNER, C., & ALEXANDER, J. (2010). Are philosophers expert intuiters? Philosophical Psychology, 23(3), 331-355.
WILLIAMSON, T. (2004). Philosophical ‘intuitions’ and scepticism about judgement. Dialectica, 58(1), 109-153.
WILLIAMSON, T. (2007). The Philosophy of Philosophy. Oxford: Blackwell.