The rehabilitation of the person after Wittgenstein and Apel, through anscombe and Llano Return to Aristotle or again Frege?

Abstract

The way Anscombe and Llano rehabilitated the notion of person after the conceptual transformation occurred in philosophy is reconstructed, whether it is postulated from Wittgenstein's Fregean proposals or from the pragmatic revision carried out by Apel.
To this end, the possible role of the practical syllogism in overcoming the paradoxes that 
originated then was reviewed, as well as in the deactivation of the critical distancing that  ittgenstein and Apel had maintained with the Fregean notion of formal concept. In any case Anscombe conceived the conceptual transformation of philosophy as a personal rehabilitation of an intentional realism of a practical nature, while Llano would add that this
personalistic rehabilitation should be granted a metaphysical intentional scope.