Pure reason and transcendental synthesis in Kant

Abstract

This paper aims to provide a rational reconstruction of pure a priori synthesis, as articulated by Kant, with regard to the communicability of human knowledge. To this end, I will primarily use the passage from the "Transcendental Deduction of the Categories" according to the 1781 version, while also considering the specific changes made in the 1787 edition. In both of them, the central issue is to explore the merits of the transcendental method to justify the presence of pure a priori concepts in our capacity for knowledge, which are responsible for the communicability of our thoughts and knowledge. I will assert from the outset that the fundamental difference between the two passages lies in the fact that in the first edition, the role of transcendental imagination is paramount, whereas in the second edition, it is eclipsed by the emphasis on understanding, which is redefined as I think and
transcendental apperception.