The virtures of vice epistemology: an overview and interdiscipliar applications
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The article presents an overview of the field of Vice Epistemology, developing its main approaches, conceptual resources and debates, while arguing how this knowledge provides benefits at the individual, interpersonal, social and work levels. With regard to oneself, it promotes self-knowledge and improved decision-making based on an analysis of motivation and the reasons for believing and acting. In interpersonal relationships, it helps to identify vices in other individuals and reduce their impact. In general, it also allows for the analysis of contextual factors that affect character and epistemic conduct. In the occupational level, especially in research, it allows for the recognition of disciplinary vices and vices that hinder epistemic goods and objectives.
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