Las virtudes de la epistemología de vicios: una panorámica y aplicaciones interdisciplinares
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El artículo presenta una panorámica del área de la epistemología de vicios, desarrollando sus principales enfoques, recursos conceptuales y debates, a la vez que argumenta cómo estos conocimientos proveen beneficios a nivel individual, interpersonal, social y laboral. Con respecto a uno mismo, promueven el autoconocimiento y la mejora en la toma de decisiones desde el análisis de la motivación y las razones para creer y actuar. En relaciones interpersonales, ayudan a identificar vicios en otros individuos y a reducir su impacto. En general, también permiten analizar factores contextuales que afectan al carácter y la conducta epistémica. En el ámbito laboral, especialmente en la investigación, permiten reconocer vicios disciplinarios y vicios que obstaculizan bienes y objetivos epistémico.
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