Epistemic relativism and pragmatic exchange a critique of the incompatibility and equal validity theses

Abstract

This text tries to question two characteristics attributed to epistemic relativism, these are 1. the “incompatibility” of epistemic systems and 2. The “equal validity” of the results-judgments derived from incompatible epistemic systems. To do so, we will take a pragmatic approach based on the philosophy of the second Wittgenstein and we will rely on a concept we call “pragmatic exchange”. With this exercise we hope to show that the “incompatibility” would apply only to those cases in which the difference between epistemic systems appears, per se, very clear, i. e. typical cases or “manual cases”. In contrast, it would not be applicable in the same way to the cases usually faced by human beings, i. e., those are open to practical considerations and exchanges of rules from different epistemic systems and different language games. In the same sense, it is hoped to show that the “equal validity” of the results or judgments does not depend on something like the “incompatibility” or independence of the different epistemic systems but on a practical judgment of the choice of the relevant rules applicable to each case