The "logical space" of perception in Aristotle

Abstract

Abstract: The discussion about the nature of perception or aisthēsis in Aristotle can already be traced back to the Ancient commentators’ works. For a couple of centuries ago, two rivals interpretations have positioned themselves as extreme variants that give us a “literalist” conception of the phenomenon in question or, on the contrary, a “spiritualist” one. However, both positions coincide in reducing the perception to a merely “given”: either purely physiological (literalism), or only intentional (spiritualism). Therefore,
the conceptual domain would be separated from the perceptual, something that, according
to the famous expression of McDowell, would represent a point of view enchanted by the
“Myth of the Given”. In this article, I will defend a moderate view of the problem through a
consideration of what could be called the “logical space” of perception, highlighting the joint
and synthetic role of dianoia in the proper discernment that involves every sense-perceptive
process of the specific soul of a human. If I am right, this kind of mythology could hardly be
endorsed to Aristotle